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Race and Community Revitalization: Communication Theory and Practice
Abstract
The words community and communications are both derived from the Latin word for common. According
to John Dewey, people "live in a community by virtue of the things they have in common; and
communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common" (1915: 4). Dewey’s point —
that communities can not exist without communications — leads to a corollary: that the nature and health
of a community depends upon the nature and health of its communications capacity. Thus, to revitalize a
community necessarily means revitalizing communications.
Communications can take many forms, ranging from face-to-face conversations among family, friends,
and neighbors to the broader flows of information that are provided through the mass media. All these
forms are central to the way communities are constructed, maintain themselves, interact with other
communities, and impact the political process. In this paper I will address how the communications
environment, as currently structured, has contributed to many of the problems faced by inner city racial
and ethnic communities in the United States.
In order to address this issue I will first discuss the importance of communications to community
development. In the next four sections I will examine relevant research regarding four key elements of the
mass media: structure; access and control; content; and impact. In the sixth section, I will explore the
literature regarding less mediated, more interpersonal communications. Throughout sections two through
five I will pay specific attention to what existing communications theories and research tell us (explicitly
or implicitly) about issues of race and ethnicity, especially as they relate to poor urban communities.
Finally, I will discuss issues regarding the intersection of race, class, and communications that require
further study, and how changes in the communications environment might contribute to the revitalization
of urban communities.
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The words community and communications are both derived from the Latin word for
common. According to John Dewey, people “live in a community by virtue of the things they have in
common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common” (1915: 4).
Dewey’s point — that communities can not exist without communications — leads to a corollary: that
the nature and health of a community depends upon the nature and health of its communications
capacity. Thus, to revitalize a community necessarily means revitalizing communications.
Communications can take many forms, ranging from face-to-face conversations among family,
friends, and neighbors to the broader flows of information that are provided through the mass media. All
these forms are central to the way communities are constructed, maintain themselves, interact with other
communities, and impact the political process. In this paper I will address how the communications
environment, as currently structured, has contributed to many of the problems faced by inner city racial
and ethnic communities in the United States.
In order to address this issue I will first discuss the importance of communications to community
development. In the next four sections I will examine relevant research regarding four key elements of
the mass media: structure; access and control; content; and impact. In the sixth section, I will explore
the literature regarding less mediated, more interpersonal communications. Throughout sections two
through five I will pay specific attention to what existing communications theories and research tell us
(explicitly or implicitly) about issues of race and ethnicity, especially as they relate to poor urban
communities. Finally, I will discuss issues regarding the intersection of race, class, and communications
that require further study, and how changes in the communications environment might contribute to the
revitalization of urban communities.
Democratic Communications in a Diverse Polity
As Robert Dahl has noted, “[t]here is no democratic theory, there are only democratic theories”
(1956: 1). However, all theories of democracy assume significant input (direct or indirect) from citizens
in the “authoritative allocation of goods, services, and values” (Easton, 1965). In turn, this assumes that
citizens have the capacity and opportunity to determine what is in their individual and collective interests,
to express and refine these interests in the public debate over “who gets what, when, and how”
(Lasswell, 1958), and to have a meaningful say in how these interests are translated into public policy.
Determining “interests” and aggregating these interests into functioning communities is no simple
matter, however. At a minimum it requires finding a balance between self-interest, the interests of others
who share similar economic, social, and cultural backgrounds, and the larger collective interests of the
polity. This process is complicated by two factors. First, in a large, diverse, and federated system such
as the United States, citizens are part of numerous, overlapping communities, each of which produces
different, often competing identities, interests, and centers of political decision making. And second,
interests are not objectively determined and permanently fixed, but are socially constructed and
“essentially contestable” (Connolly, 1983).
The formation of communities is complicated in the United States by the great diversity of the
population and by the federated nature of the political system. This results in membership in numerous
real and potential communities. For example, the interests of a poor, African American woman living in
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Harlem are shaped by a number of factors: her race, gender, economic status, place of residence,
citizenship in New York City, New York State, and the United States, and so forth. Each of these
characteristics potentially binds this woman to others who are similarly situated, while at the same time
distinguishes her interests from those with different backgrounds and experiences.
However, these differences and similarities do not, in and of themselves, assure the formation of
communities. Communities — the African American community, the Harlem community, the poor
community, the community of women, the New York City community, the New York State community,
the U.S. community, and so forth — are socially constructed through the intersection of objective
conditions, a comparison of those conditions with the conditions of others, and an interpretation of the
reasons for differences and similarities across individuals and groups. Distinct communities emerge
when groups of individuals who share common conditions (e.g., geographic location, economic and
political status, cultural heritage, historical experiences, etc.,) come to see both how these conditions
bind them together, and how they differentiate them as a group from other individuals and groups. In
short, community development requires both objective similarities that connect people to each other
while distinguishing them from others, and a conscious awareness of those similarities and differences.
Communications is critical to the processes of interest formation and community development.
Through the open exchange of information and opinions, citizens come to know not only their own
interests, but the interests of others and how those interests tie them together into communities. This
process does not assure consensus — there are real differences across individuals and groups. At a
minimum, however, it provides the opportunity to understand these differences and negotiate ways to
assure that different views are included in the authoritative allocation of goods, services, and values that
is at the heart of the policy making process.
A democratic communications environment in a diverse but interconnected society must operate
at three levels. First, there must be the opportunity for effective, ongoing intra-group communications.
Communities of interests based on economics, culture, geography, race or ethnicity, and so forth, need
ways of exchanging information and opinions in order to form, develop, and maintain themselves.
Further, this exchange of information needs to be controlled by the community members themselves,
rather than imposed from the outside. Second, there must be the opportunity for effective, ongoing
inter-group communications. The exchange of information across groups serves to increase mutual
understanding and respect, reveal areas of consensus, and highlight real differences of opinion that need
to be addressed.
Both intra and inter group communications are horizontal, in that they assume some degree of
equality in the exchange of opinions and information across individuals and groups. But a democratic
information environment also requires effective vertical communication. Communities should have the
ability to communicate effectively with policy makers, allowing for ongoing and open exchanges of
information and ideas.
Horizontal and vertical communications can take place directly through face-to-face interactions
and indirectly through the mass media. Interpersonal communications that involve public as opposed to
private opinion (Barber, 1984) require both the motivation to join with others to deliberate about public
issues and the opportunity to do so. Such public gatherings (in town halls, at schools and community
centers, in living rooms, etc.) are critical to the identification of collective interests, the formation of a
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sense of community, the exchange of opinions across communities, and the articulation of community
interests to policy makers.
At the same time, much of the communications within communities, across communities, and
with political elites is mediated. The mass media — newspapers, magazines, radio, television, the
internet, etc. — are central to these exchanges in four ways. First, as information sources from which
citizens can learn about the world in which they live, including parts of that world with which they have
little or no direct contact. Second as channels through which citizens can express their views and
present themselves to their fellow citizens and public officials. Third, as forums in which opinions are
publically exchanged, debated, and constructed. And fourth, as political actors in their own right,
serving as gatekeepers who determine the content and structure of public debate, as well as who
participates in this debate.
In short, understanding inner city racial/ethnic community development and revitalization requires
understanding: (1) the structure of the communications environment; (2) How this structure affects
control of and access to the media; (3) how biases in control and access affect the content of the
information environment; and (4) how content affects the formation of public opinion, the acquisition of
political information, and the shaping of collective identities.
The Structure of The Mass Media
The structure of the mass media in the contemporary United States is characterized by three
central characteristics: it is privately owned, highly centralized, and elite dominated. These
characteristics affect all citizens, but have particular, usually insidious, implications for poor, local, and
non-white communities. This is true because these communities lack the economic resources often
necessary to effectively control or get access to the media.
Private Ownership: In the United States, the media is largely privately owned and run. This is
especially true in the print media, but even in electronic media, where public ownership is more widely
accepted, private media dominates: of the 1,449 television stations in the United States in 1990, 1,100
were commercial, as were 9,300 of the 10, 688 radio stations (Jamieson and Campbell, 1992: 19-27).
The dominance of private over public media is deeply imbedded in mainstream American
political ideology. According to Theodore Peterson, the functions of the U.S. media are:
(1) servicing the political system by providing information, discussion, and debate on public
affairs; (2) enlightening the public so as to make it capable of self-government; (3) safeguarding
the rights of the individual by serving as a watchdog against government; (4) servicing the
economic system, primarily by bringing together the buyers and sellers of goods and services
through the medium of advertising; (5) providing entertainment; (6) maintaining its own financial
self-sufficiency so as to be free from the pressures of special interests. (1956: 74)
According to the “libertarian theory” of the press, which dominated in the 18th century
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(Peterson, 1956), private ownership would help insulate the media from the coercive power of
government. At the same time, the economic free market would allow for the development of competing
media voices, creating a parallel market place of ideas. This open exchange of ideas would create a
“self-righting process” (Milton, 1644) in which “a livelier impression of the truth [would be] produced
by its collision with error” (J. S. Mill, 1859: 18). In short, the civic goals represented by functions one
through three above would be achieved as a by-product of functions four through six.
There are inherent tensions in both the logic and practice of the libertarian theory of the press.
Regarding the former, the greatest tensions are between the civic goals (providing information,
discussion, and debate; enlightening the public; and serving as a watchdog of government) on the one
hand, and the goals of entertainment and economic self-sufficiency on the other. Put simply, being
entertaining and economically successful often can come at the expense of being informative,
enlightening, and vigilant. Further, the libertarian theory’s emphasis on protecting citizens from the
coercive power of the government under emphasizes the potentially coercive power of the market
(Postman, 1985; Bagdikian, 1992).
Regarding the actual practice of the media, the notion that all citizens truly had the means to
express their views through the press is a fiction. While it is true that, during the 18th century, most
communities in the United States had several daily presses representing fairly diverse ideological
perspectives, access to — let alone control of — this public conversation was always more difficult for
poorer, non-white citizens (Dates, 1990; Emery and Emery, 1988).
Centralization of Ownership and Information: While the market place of ideas was never
fully realized, ownership of the media has become increasingly centralized in the 20th century.
According to Ben Bagdikian (1992), in 1983 50 national and international corporations already
controlled a majority of “media voices” in the United States (measured by circulation, revenue, and/or
audiences). By 1992, this number had shrunk to 20. For example, of the 3,000 book publishers in the
United States, five produce most of the revenue. Eleven companies control a majority of the daily
circulation of newspapers. Two companies produce over half the revenue for magazine sales. The
three major networks, while less dominant than in the past, still consistently capture a majority share of
television viewers and radio listeners. Four film studios control a majority of movie audiences. In
addition, cross-ownership (for example, the same company owning both radio and television stations, or
television stations and newspapers) has increased dramatically (Bagdikian, 1992: ix-45).
New media outlets such as cable, satellite broadcast, and the internet open the possibility of a
richer and more diverse information environment (discussed in more detail below). But even in these
mediums there is a trend toward centralization of ownership . Nearly half of the top 50 cable systems in
the United States are owned by the broadcast networks, with another third owned by newspaper and
magazine publishers (Graber, 1997: 396). And, as the ongoing “browser wars” suggest, corporate
control of the internet and world wide web is a very real possibility.
The centralization of ownership has led to a parallel centralization of information. For example,
of the 1,526 cities with a daily newspaper, only 44 have at least 2 separately owned newspapers, a
sharp decline from 19th and early 20th centuries (Jamieson and Campbell, 1992: 27). And while most
communities do have multiple sources of information (newspapers, radio, cable and broadcast
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television, etc.), this information is likely to come from similar and non-local sources. For example, wire
services now dominate the news in most local papers — especially chain-owned papers. Even local
radio stations are dominated by non-local broadcasts such as nationally syndicated shows and pretaped, fully automated programming (Jamieson and Campbell (1992: 26).
The result of this dual centralization of ownership and information has been the creation of mass
audiences with little control over the form and content of the information that is presented. This works
against intra-group communication, since the pressure to reach increasingly broad audiences provides
few incentives to focus on the interests and views of select communities — especially poor communities.
And while the broad reach of the media increases the possibility of both inter-group and elite-public
communications, specific communities, especially poor, urban, ethnic communities, lack direct control or
input in these mediated conversations.
The centralization of ownership and information in the latter half of this century created an
environment in which one could no longer even assume a market place of ideas or a self-righting
process. This centralization, coupled with the ability to reach large, diverse audiences, increased the
already substantial power of the press. As a result, the libertarian theory gave way to a new “social
responsibility” theory of the press (Peterson, 1956). This theory was an attempt to preserve the ends of
the libertarian theory through different means. By separating fact from opinion, providing competing
facts, opinions, and critiques, fairly representing different groups, presenting and clarifying societal
values, and providing a full range of critical information in the same publication or broadcast,
competition among numerous and separately owned media voices was assumed to be less vital.
The reality of contemporary mass media falls quite short of these goals for two reasons,
however. First, a highly centralized media in a economically, culturally, and ethnically diverse society
can never fairly represent the full range of opinions nor truly separate fact from opinion. Second, the
economic incentives of the media necessarily mean that majority interests in general and the interests of
economically powerful communities in particular, will dominate. This combination is particularly
damaging to poor, ethnic communities that have neither the numbers nor the economic clout to attract
the attention of, let alone to control, the media.
The recent increase in “channels “ of communication provided by cable and the internet has led
to the greater ability to target information to more narrowly defined communities, thus increasing the
possibilities for intra-group communications. In addition, these additional outlets seem to allow for a
greater variety of opinions and information. In reality, however, while audiences have become
somewhat more segmented, the vast majority of the information received is still generally centrally
produced and distributed. At the same time, greater segmentation of audiences can work against intergroup communications, as groups selectively choose information sources aimed exclusively at
themselves, reducing the exchanges across diverse communities.
A privately owned, economically driven, and highly centralized mass media is poorly designed
to serve the interests of poor, inner city racial and ethnic groups. At the level of intra-group
communications, there are few mediums (print or electronic) designed to be exclusive sources of
information, channels of exchange, or forums for deliberation for these segments of the population.
While newspapers, magazines, radio stations, and television programs aimed at specific ethnic and racial
groups exist, they represent a small proportion of the larger information environment. In addition, few of
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these outlets are aimed at poor ethnic and racial communities, are controlled by these communities, or
are designed primarily for providing meaningful civic information, exchanges, and forums.
The history of the black press is instructive both in terms of the importance of having media
designed to address the interests of specific communities and the difficulty of maintaining such a press in
the current economic and social environment. As Janette Dates (1990) notes, without black owned and
operated newspapers, “there would have been no print medium of communications for African
Americans that could instill a sense of community, a feeling of self-worth, or keep alive the often muted
struggle to escape, first slavery, and then the clutches of segregation and discrimination” (p. 346).
However, she also notes:
In the early 1800s newspapers were the primary vehicle of the black press, and their
publication dominated the focus of the black press for more than a hundred years. In the
middle 1900s, however, other types of periodicals gained popularity with black
audiences. By the late 1900s, black magazines had taken over many of the functions
that black newspapers had previously claimed for themselves, particularly as the year
2000 approached. Part of the reason for the increased role of black magazines at this
time lay in the declining quality of reporting and commentary in black newspapers. In
fact, at this juncture, many black newspapers had become scandal sheets with
sensational, screaming headlines and offensive pictures. Moreover, there was limited
coverage of events, frequent misprints, outdated formats, smudgy ink, and a general
perception that black newspapers were either too radical or too conservative and were
thus failing to reflect true views of the black community. People were no longer proud
to take black newspapers home to share articles with their families. Many hesitated to
encourage their children to see or read the papers. By the 1980s black newspapers
across the country had lost much of their credibility in African American communities as
providers of reliable and enlightened black perspectives and as protectors of black
interests. (P.345)
The result has been a steady erosion of economically viable, high quality, black newspapers in most
urban areas:
More than 3000 black newspapers — owned and edited by blacks for black readers
— have appeared since Freedom’s Journal made its 1827 bow.... Pride’s [1951]
figures showed that 1187 black papers were added during the years 1865 to 1900 to
the forty founded before 1865. Another 1500 had been added by 1951, but the
survivors numbered only 175. The average life span of a black newspaper, Pride
found, was 9 years. (Emery and Emery, 1988: 266)
Tellingly, this problem was exacerbated by integration in the 1960s:
For, with integration, many black newspapers also lost their “natural” advertisers, black
businesses, to the general market press. In addition, many small black businesses had
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gone under, as black consumers, like their white counterparts, flocked to the major
chain stores for purchases. As their revenues decreased, black newspapers also lost
much of their talent to the general market papers, which paid their staff higher salaries
and offered them more career opportunities. (Dates, 1990: 345)
In addition, surviving black newspapers and black-oriented magazines tend to focus on middle
class black audiences, further limiting the opportunity for poor blacks to have outlets for the formation
and expression their views, and thus for the construction of a sense of community.
An Elite Dominated Press: While the availability of multiple, privately-owned presses was an
important element of the libertarian theory of the press, equally important (though less often articulated)
was the belief that citizens had the ability, opportunity, and motivation to actively participate in the civic
and cultural market place. It is no coincidence that the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives
equal attention to rights of a free press, free speech, and of the peaceable assembly of citizens, as the
three rights are inextricably intertwined. The “truth” about the social and political world would not
emerge from the pages of newspapers and pamphlets, but was constructed and constantly revisited
through the interaction of the press and the citizenry.
Poor people and non-whites were never considered part of this public conversation by the
framers. The same constitution that protected the rights of a free press, free speech and free assembly
also upheld the right of slavery and reduced African Americans to two-thirds of a human being. And
state constitutions prohibited poor people (and women) from voting. Not coincidentally, as the poor,
African Americans, other ethnic minorities, and women asserted their rights as citizens, the social
responsibility theory shifted much of the power once placed with citizens to political elites. This
declining faith in citizens is most clearly seen in the 1920s debate between Walter Lippmann and John
Dewey on the nature of “the public.” For Lippmann (1925), the modern public was a “phantom,” an
artificially constructed collection of individuals who were generally uninformed about and disconnected
from politics, who lacked the time, skills, and interest to take a direct role in their own governance, and
who were easily swayed by seemingly persuasive arguments of the moment. The contemporary media,
from this perspective, could easily become a propaganda tool used to manipulate and misrepresent the
public in ways that could threaten the stability and order of society. To avoid this, the press must serve
as a vigilant watchdog, guarding against demagogues. The goal of the press was not to provide
information that would allow citizens to come to their own conclusions on the substantive issues of the
day or to engage citizens in public discourse, but to create an environment in which they could choose
among competing elites who would be responsible for the real work of democracy and policy making.
Since the substance of politics and policy would be determined by experts, the substance of journalism
should focus on this expert class. At best, the press could signal citizens when certain elites, experts, or
ideas posed a threat to the democratic process.
Dewey, too, saw problems with the modern public, but drew different conclusions from these
observations (1927). While he acknowledged the existence and importance of experts, Dewey
believed that citizens were capable of engaging experts and their ideas and contributing to public
deliberation. The nature and quality of public deliberation were not preordained, but depended upon the
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opportunities presented to citizens by the public sphere. Given these opportunities, Dewey had faith
that the public could play a more active, direct, and rational role in its own governance. These
opportunities would come from many places, such as the education system and other public institutions.
One key institution was the press. The press’s responsibility was to provide the kind of information that
could be used by citizens to understand not only the issues of the day, but that would also provide the
context within which to use that information, and the skills necessary to do so. In addition, the public
required a public sphere that would allow them to openly deliberate about civic issues. Here, again the
press was critical, as it could serve as a public space for such deliberation.
In short, where Lippmann saw citizens necessarily as the passive consumers of the news, and
saw the press as the place for an exchange of facts, opinions and ideas among elites and experts
(including journalists and columnists), Dewey saw citizens as potentially active participants in this
exchange, and saw the press as a fundamental part of the social fabric and the place where experts
would inform, educate, and engage the public in issues of the day.
Elements of Lippmann and Dewey can be found in the tenets of both the libertarian theory of the
press and its reincarnation in the social responsibility theory. However, the specific way in which these
theories are put into practice vary significantly depending on whether Lippmann’s or Dewey’s views
prevail. As has been noted by several students of the press (Carey, 1988; 1989; Rosen, 1998),
Lippmann’s view has come to dominate the journalistic profession.
This elitist view of politics and the media worked against poor, urban, ethnic/racial communities
in two ways. First, by assuming public discourse was the purview of elites, these communities were
effectively cut off from direct access to the media. Second, since “elite” was defined as white, male,
middle class citizens, the media’s notions of fairness, objectivity, and representation were unlikely to
address concerns specific to these communities — in short, were unlikely to actually be fair, objective,
or representative. The result has been a hegemonic press in which the media serves as central
gatekeeper, determining the lines between consensus, legitimate controversy, and deviance (Hallin,
1986; Herman and Chomsky, 1988), and which groups and ideas fall into each of these spheres.
Control and Access
As noted earlier, effective, democratic intra-group communications requires control of the
means of communication by the group in question. A privately owned, economically driven, highly
centralized, and elite dominated media severely limits intra-group communications for local, poor, nonwhite citizens. Ownership of newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations, film studios, and the
like by African Americans, Latinos, and Asians falls well below their percentages in the population
(Dates and Barlow, 1990; Jamieson and Campbell, 1992; Emery and Emery, 1988). Needless to say,
this is especially true of poor ethnic minorities, who by definition, lack the resources to own media.
Even the minority owned and run print and electronic media that do exist tend to focus, for economic
reasons, on the interests and concerns of middle class, upwardly mobile consumers.
The structure of the mass media also works against the use of the elite-owned mainstream press
for meaningful intra-group, inter-group, and elite-public communications. Blacks, Latinos, and Asians
are significantly under-represented in employment within the mainstream media: editors, producers,
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directors, journalists and reporters, actors, and so forth are disproportionately white, male, and/or
middle-to-upper class. Thus, the perspectives of these groups, especially regarding issues where
significant class and ethnic/racial differences of opinion exist, are likely to be missed or misrepresented.
In addition, the needs of the mainstream media to attract large, economically well-of audiences
decreases the incentives to cover issues or provide cultural outlets that appeal to or represent poor
minority groups. Finally, the “social responsibility” norms of the media, coupled with the bias towards
elites, while intended to be balanced, fair, and representative, lead to an undervaluing of “nonauthoritative” sources, and “non-mainstream” interests such as those of poor, urban racial minorities.
As a result, poor, urban, and/or non-white ethnic groups lack the means for communicating
effectively among themselves, with other communities, or with political elites, and are thus effectively cut
of from public conversations regarding politics, culture, and society.
Content
As a result of this systematic bias, urban, poor, ethnic/racial communities, and the issues of
central importance to them are (1) generally under-represented in the mass media; and (2) presented
from a white, middle class, elite perspective when they are represented. According to a recent review
of the literature (Gilens, 1996), studies
have consistently found that blacks are underrepresented in the American news media,
whether it be television (Baran 1973), newspapers (Chaudhary 1980), or
newsmagazines (Lester and Smith 1990; Stempel 1971). The underrepresentation of
African Americans has decreased over time, however. Lester and Smith (1990), for
example, found that only 1.3 percent of the pictures in Time and Newsweek during the
1950s were of blacks, compared with 3.1 percent in the 1960s and 7.5 percent in the
1980s. (P.518)
Studies of entertainment media and children’s programming have found similar patterns of under
but gradually increasing representation of minorities, though the proportion of minorities in both news
and non-news media remains less than one would expect given their percentages in the population, and
gains for Latinos and Asians have been less dramatic than for African Americans (Greenberg, 1986;
Liebert and Sprafkin, 1988; Dates and Barlow, 1990). The increase in the number of non-whites is
also largely driven by an increased visibility on a few shows — one study found that 75 percent of the
total time African Americans were visible on television took place on only 18 percent of the shows
(cited in Greenberg, 1986). Non-whites are also less likely to be seen in advertising (in print or
electronic media), especially as the central figures (Greenberg, 1996), though again there is
improvement in this area. Further, minorities are still grossly under represented as “experts” in the
media — for example, one study found that over 90 percent of the expert guests on MacNeil/Lehrer
and Nightline were white males (Croteau and Hoynes, 1996).
At least as troubling as under-representation is the misrepresentation of minority populations.
Minorities in the mainstream media are consistently and disproportionately portrayed in a negative light.
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For example, Entman (1990; 1994) found that nearly 60 percent of
network news stories showed blacks as either the victims or the perpetrators of social misfortunes. A
study of advertisements in Time magazine found that 10 percent of the blacks shown were poor,
compared to none of the whites (Humphrey and Schuman, 1984). And, while two out of three poor
Americans are non-black, two out of every three poor people pictured in Time, Newsweek, and U.S.
News and World Report, the three leading news magazines in the United States, were black (Gilens,
1996).
The most systematic work on the content of mainstream media and changes in that content over
time over the last three decades has been conducted by George Gerbner and various colleagues
associated with the Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania. This
research largely confirms the patterns described above: general under representation of non-whites
(especially for African Americans), especially in terms of major characters on entertainment television or
as authoritative sources in the news; under representation of non-whites in white collar and professional
roles; and the tendency for non-whites to be portrayed as “less serious” than whites. As with other
studies, this ongoing research has found evidence of improvement in these areas over time. In addition,
there is some evidence that non-whites are more likely to be portrayed as married, for family life to be
more important in their lives, and to be younger on average than whites.
A few studies have explicitly compared the behavior of whites and non-whites on prime time
television (Reid, 1979; Baptista-Fernandez and Greenberg, 1980; Weigel, et al., 1980). These studies
(most of which are dated) found that African American characters were portrayed as seeking more
recognition for their deeds, being younger, and being less frequently employed than their white
counterparts. Black women were portrayed as less achieving, less succorant, more boasting and more
dominant than White women. In addition, only 2 percent of air time was devoted to inter-racial
interactions, and these interactions were characterized by
less shared decision-making, narrower, more formal relationships, less intimate personal
relationships, and almost no romantic relationships. Friendships and nonwork
relationships were more common in white-white interactions. Blacks and whites
discussed problem alternatives in but 13% of the possible situations, compared to 56%
of the white-white decisions. Black-white interactions occurred almost exclusively in
job-related contexts, compared to half of the white-white relationships. Thus, crossracial relationships are infrequent and relatively formal. Blacks and whites can work
together but do not maintain the same degree of voluntary, individualized relationships
that whites do. For the most part, blacks and whites appear on different shows; when
they do appear together, they largely maintain that separateness. (Greenberg, 1986:
170).
Five caveats to this generally negative picture need to be considered, however. First, the trends
are clearly in positive directions, especially in very recent years. Second, many of the studies are dated,
thus potentially missing very recent improvements. Third, I know of no studies that have examined the
representation of non-whites in the expanded television environment of cable. Fourth, most of these
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studies focus on the portrayal of non-whites in general, and do not explore the portrayal of poor and/or
urban ethnic minorities in particular. And fifth, these studies are largely based on aggregate patterns —
the assumption of these studies is that people are influenced by the number of positive or negative
portrayals. We know little, however, about the impact of specific negative or positive portrayals that
may be non-representative of the media in general, but that are particularly effective in challenging or
reinforcing racial stereotypes.
The Impact of Structural and Representational Bias
Given evidence of structural biases in the media environment, and evidence that these biases
lead to biases in media content, the question becomes what difference this makes. Research in political
communications that focuses on individual-level impact reveal several ways in which media matters.
Agenda-Setting: Research strongly suggests that the media plays an important, even central,
role in determining what issues citizens regard as most important. As Bernard Cohen put it, “The press...
may not be successful in telling readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling readers
what to think about” (1963: 13). This finding has been supported in a number of studies and for both
print and electronic media (Behr and Iyengar, 1985; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; McCombs, 1981;
Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey, 1987; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Shaw and Martin, 1992). As Doris
Graber (1997) notes, however, citizens do not slavishly follow the media in all circumstances: “past and
current experiences, conversations with others, and independent reasoning provide alternatives to media
guidance.... media guidance is most important for new issues that have not been widely discussed and
for issues beyond the realm of personal experience” (p.201-202. Also see Ader, 1995; Behr and
Iyengar, 1981). Agenda-setting is also most likely when various media simultaneously focus on the same
issue or set of issues.
While the agenda-setting literature does not specifically focus on questions of race or on issues
of special importance to inner city revitalization (with the exception of crime), it is of obvious relevance
to these concerns. In particular, it suggests that, absent direct experience or contact, the media’s
coverage (or lack thereof) of issues of special relevance to inner cities and/or non-white ethnic/racial
groups will play an important role in whether these issues are on white, non-urban America’s political
agenda. The often great disparity of views between whites and non-whites and between people of lower
and higher economic status regarding issues of social welfare, race relations, and affirmative action
(Erikson and Tedin, 1995: 179-193) supports this conclusion (discussed in more detail below).
The agenda-setting literature also suggests that, given personal experience and direct contact
with the problems of inner cities, residents of these areas may find little of direct relevance in mainstream
mass media’s coverage of social and political issues, and thus turn away from such media. Research on
media use provides some support for this proposition. Upper income Americans are much more likely
to use multiple forms of mass media than are lower income Americans, and African Americans are less
likely than whites to depend on the mainstream media for political Information (Graber, 1997: 195196). One study found that whites in a low-income Los Angeles neighborhood were almost twice as
likely to use mainstream mass media for political information as were African Americans, with Latinos
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even less likely to do so (Williams, Dordick, and Horstmann, 1977). At the same time, African
Americans and lower income Americans are significantly more likely to watch television than are whites
and upper income Americans (Graber, 1997: 195-196), though less likely to watch television news.
Framing and Priming: In addition to drawing attention to certain issues (and, in doing so,
drawing attention away from other issues) the media have also been shown to shape the way issues are
presented (framing) and thus to influence public reaction to them (priming). Research has shown that
television — the most common source of political and non-political information in the United states —
tends to frame most social issues episodically rather than thematically:
Episodic framing depicts issues in terms of concrete instances or specific events — a
homeless person, an unemployed worker, a victim of racial discrimination, the bombing
of an air-liner, an attempted murder, and so on. The thematic news frame, on the other
hand, places public issues in some general or abstract context. The thematic news frame
typically takes the form of an in-depth, “backgrounder” report dealing with general
outcomes or conditions. While episodic reports are often visually appealing, thematic
reports consist primarily of “talking heads.” (Ansolabahere, Behr, and Iyengar, 1993:
145).
For example, Iyengar (1991) found that 89 percent of network news reports on crime were episodic
rather than thematic. The importance of how news is framed lies in its ability to “prime” the way viewers
assign responsibility for social problems:
Viewers who are exposed to news coverage that is thematically framed tend to assign
responsibility for national issues to societal factors — cultural values; economic
circumstances; or the motives, actions and inactions of government officials.... However,
when television news coverage is heavily episodic (as is usually the case for issues such
as poverty, crime, and terrorism), viewers attribute responsibility not to societal forces,
but to the private motives and actions of poor people, criminals, and terrorists,
respectively.
While these studies have focused on national television news, content analyses of local news strongly
suggest that its coverage of issues is also dominated by episodic coverage (Entman, 1990; 1994). In
addition, while newspaper coverage is traditionally more thematic than television, it, too, is becoming
more episodic over time.
I know of few studies which look specifically at the effects of framing and priming on inner city
racial/ethnic communities. Nonetheless, the significance of framing and priming for revitalizing urban
communities is clear. At a minimum, the largely episodic coverage of social and economic problems of
relevance to inner cities means that the public is primed to view these problems as resulting from the
behavior of inner city residents themselves, rather than due to larger social, economic, and political
factors. This would work against developing coalitions outside poor urban communities to solve these
12

problems in ways that would address larger structural issues. And to the extent that such media
portrayals also lead inner city residents to blame themselves or their neighbors for the problems they
face, it would also work against the formation of a strong, politically active, community identity.
Research by Gandy et al. (1996), finds evidence that when newspapers aimed largely at white,
middle class, audiences address issues of social risk (for example, job loss, cancer rates, police
brutality, etc.) in racial terms, they tend to emphasize black loss while downplaying white gains or
losses. Further, they find that structural causes (such as racism) for the disparities between blacks and
whites are more likely to be mentioned in stories involving economics and government services than
health care or the criminal justice system. While they do not look specifically at the effects of this type
of framing, they provide a suggestive argument that the impact of such coverage on white readers would
be to both discount systematic racism as the cause of black risk in health and criminal justice matters,
and to discount the risk to white populations. Both effects, if true, would work against the formation of
cross-community coalitions aimed at remedying such problems.
Attitudes and Opinions: Public opinion research finds strong evidence of significant
differences of opinions across different economic and racial groups. Many of these differences, perhaps
unsurprisingly, are strongest in the areas of direct relevance to inner city racial/ethnic communities —
government assistance in jobs and welfare, affirmative action, and race relations.
Lower income Americans are significantly more likely than middle and upper income Americans
to support increased government spending on the homeless, the poor, social security, unemployment
assistance, childcare, and student loans. They are also more supportive of programs guaranteeing jobs
and minimum standards of living. Differences across economic groups can also be found in areas other
than social welfare, though much of these differences are accounted for by educational, rather than
purely economic, differences. Lower income Americans are less likely to support government spending
on science and technology or foreign aid. They are generally more conservative on social issues
(showing less support for equal roles for women, abortion rights, gays in the military, rights of the
accused), and more isolationist on foreign affairs (showing less support for U.S. involvement abroad and
in the United Nations, and greater opposition to communism). Lower income Americans are also more
likely to identify with the Democratic party and vote for Democratic candidates (Erikson and Tedin,
1994: 177-188).
African Americans are generally more Democratic and more liberal than whites, showing greater
support for government social welfare spending and services, for government efforts to guarantee jobs
and a minimum standard of living, and for anti-discrimination laws to protect homosexuals. African
Americans are also more likely to oppose the death penalty and to have opposed U.S. military
intervention in the Persian Gulf (Erikson and Tedin, 1994: 191; Dawson, 1994: 189-191).
African Americans are much more likely than whites to believe that the civil rights movement
helped blacks, but to also believe that significant social and economic inequities still exist, and that the
pace of change has been too slow (Sigelman and Welch, 1991). Given these differences, it is not
surprising that African Americans are also much more likely than whites to believe that government
should work towards improving the economic and social conditions of blacks and other minorities,
including through educational quotas and employment and promotion preferences (Sigelman and Welch,
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1991: 119-145; Erikson and Tedin, 1994: 190).
The greatest controversy regarding racial attitudes involves the issue of racism. Surveys find that
whites are much less likely to subscribe to the most overt forms of racism (those based on arguments of
genetic differences), and a good deal less likely to hold negative stereotypes of blacks, than in the past.
Nonetheless, significant percentages of whites still say that blacks are unintelligent (24%), lazy (31%),
not determined to succeed (22%), not hard working (17%), not dependable (13%), lack discipline
(60%), and are violent or aggressive (50%) (Peffley and Shields, 1996: 184-85).
In addition to this evidence of considerable and continuing overt racism among whites, there is
also considerable evidence regarding the existence of symbolic racism. Symbolic racism refers to
attitudes regarding blacks (and other ethnic minorities), that, while avoiding direct statements of
racial/ethnic inferiority, discount the existence of discrimination, blames minorities for their economic and
social status, and, thus, opposes policies designed to implicitly or explicitly benefit minorities. For
example, Sears, et al., (1996) measures symbolic racism as the denial of continuing racial discrimination,
the absence of positive emotions towards blacks, the belief that blacks should work harder, the belief
that civil rights leaders make excessive demands, and the belief that blacks have an undeserved
advantage (pp. 25-26).
The concept of symbolic racism is controversial. Sniderman and Piazza (1993) argue that
general political ideology and notions of fairness and equality, rather than racial prejudice, underlie
whites’ opposition to policies designed to benefit blacks. While this debate remains unresolved, the
research documenting both overt and symbolic racism, and its impact on the policy stands and voting
behavior of whites, is, to my mind, compelling (Sears, et al, 1996; Meertens and Pettigrew, 1996;
Kinder and Sanders, 1996).
Research on attitudes about race in general and the views of African Americans in particular
have been hampered by four factors. First, most surveys, especially national surveys, have relatively
small percentages of African Americans, making fine-grained analyses of black opinion difficult.
Second, most studies have focused exclusively or predominantly on white opinions about race. Third,
issues of race are highly charged, making it difficult to accurately capture “true” opinions through
surveys. And fourth, closed-ended surveys often miss subtle differences in meaning that can be
imbedded in similar responses across the races.
Recent research, aided by new surveys of African Americans and innovative research designs
have begun to remedy these problems. This research finds greater variation in African American
opinion than often reported, with financially better off blacks less liberal on social welfare and racespecific policies than less well-off blacks (Dawson, 1994). Trend data also suggests that both blacks
and whites have become more conservative on social welfare policies and that whites have become
more liberal on civil rights (with the exception of busing), shrinking the differences across the races
(Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, 1985; Page and Shapiro, 1992). However, both in general and within
specific economic classes, African Americans continue to hold significantly more liberal opinions on
social welfare, government programs aimed specifically at blacks and minorities, and civil rights than do
whites (Dawson, 1994; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, 1985).
One of the most telling findings regarding black opinion is the extent and persistence of beliefs
among African Americans that white Americans hold negative stereotypes of them. Research by
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Sigelman and Tuch (1996) shows that large percentages of African Americans believe whites endorse a
number of racial stereotypes: for example, that blacks prefer to live off welfare (75%), are violent
(82%), are lazy (69%), are unintelligent (76%), and are unpatriotic (44%). Significantly, while these
percentages are higher than those actually reported by whites, they generally correspond with white
attitudes, leading Sigelman and Tuch to conclude that black’s views on white’s racial stereotypes are
generally accurate. In addition, these views are strongest among black women, younger blacks, and
higher income blacks. The findings for age and income “confirm growing evidence of a deepening
alienation from white society among that segment of the black population that, ostensibly, is the most
successful and integrated” (Bobo, 1996: 7; Also see Bobo, et al., 1994; Cose, 1994; Feagin and Sikes,
1994; Hochschild, 1995).
While research on racial attitudes and opinions shows significant and often troubling patterns,
there is remarkably little research on the role of communications in the formation and maintenance of
these views, especially regarding the views of African Americans. Dawson (1994), found that use of
the mainstream mass media was significantly and negatively related to African American survey
respondents’ sense of community among blacks (linked fate) and a belief that they had personally
benefitted from the civil rights movement:
Being an urban resident and being exposed to mainstream media served to weaken the
link between individual African Americans and the group as a whole. Commentators as
disparate as Marable and Wilson suggested that the increasing social disorganization of
the inner cities has led to a breakdown of community (Wilson, 1987) and a lessening of
group consciousness (Marable, 1983). The urban residence finding was consistent with
their hypotheses. The finding that exposure to mainstream media served to weaken
perceptions of linked fate is consistent with findings by Allen and Kuo (1990) that
mainstream media can act as a conservative force.... As with linked fate, the more
exposure one had to mainstream media, the less likely one was to believe that the black
movement had affected oneself. (Pp. 82-83)
In one of the few studies regarding the impact of the media on children’s attitudes towards race,
Graves (1975) found that negative portrayals of blacks increased white children’s racial stereotyping,
while positive portrayals led to more positive opinions. However, for black children, the mere presence
of blacks in the media — whether positively or negatively portrayed — led to more positive opinions.
Research by Armstrong, Neuendorf, and Brentar (1992) found different impacts for viewing
entertainment television versus the news. For white viewers, exposure to entertainment television was
correlated with more positive views regarding the socioeconomic status of blacks, while viewing the
news was correlated with more negative views. The authors postulate that these differences were due
to the tendency for entertainment television to portray blacks in professional, middle class roles, while
blacks in the news are more often from poorer backgrounds (Gandy and Mantabane, 1989).
Significantly, black viewers of both news and entertainment media were less affected, presumably due
to their ability to draw on personal experience.
In an innovative experimental design, Peffley, Shields, and Williams showed white viewers a
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local news story in which the race of a crime suspect was the only difference between two edited
versions. They found that in the “black suspect” version, viewers were significantly more likely believe
the suspect was guilty, to believe the suspect was likely to commit further crimes, to feel anger towards
the suspect, and to recommend a harsher penalty. Similarly, research on the impact of the infamous
“Willy Horton” 1988 presidential campaign ad suggests that viewing the ad activated whites’ latent
prejudices, priming not only reactionary attitudes towards crime (the ostensible subject of the ad), but
also towards a much broader set of race-related policies (Mendelberg, 1996).
George Gerbner and his associates have taken an approach to the impact of television called
cultivation analysis. This approach is similar to priming (discussed above), but focuses on the impact
of the broader media environment (prime time entertainment and news) rather than on the impact of
particular broadcasts or genres. Their research suggests that heavy viewers of television tend to see the
real world in ways that are more similar to how it is portrayed on television than do light viewers. Thus,
when television (directly or indirectly) provides positive racial images, heavy viewers are more likely to
reflect these views in their own opinions about race, but when (as is more often the case) these images
are negative or stereotypical, heavy viewers express arguably more prejudiced views.
Factual Information: Much of my own research has been in the area of citizens’ factual
knowledge about politics and the impact of this knowledge on attitudes and behaviors (Delli Carpini and
Keeter, 1996). This research has several implications for issues of race and community revitalization.
First, we found that aggregate levels of political knowledge were generally low. Second, however, we
found significant and sizable variation in levels of knowledge, with lower income and African American
citizens less politically informed than upper income and white Americans. Indeed, high income whites
scored more than twice as high on our tests of general political knowledge than did low income blacks.
Third, these differences were largely attributable to structural inequities — low income blacks are
disproportionately less educated, less likely to be in high status occupations, and (by definition) less
well-off financially, and all of these factors increase the motivations, opportunities, and skills necessary
for obtaining and retaining political information.
The significance of these findings for issues of race and community revitalization are twofold.
First, we found that more informed citizens were more likely than less informed citizens to participate in
politics, to hold stable, consistent opinions, and to effectively tie their opinions to their political behaviors
(e.g., to vote for or more generally support candidates and parties whose views on policy matters most
closely resembled their own on). Thus, to the extent that blacks in general and poor blacks in particular
are relatively uninformed about politics, these citizens are less likely to participate and less likely to do
so effectively. Second, while as discussed above, blacks are generally more supportive of government
programs designed to assist lower income and minority citizens, we found that greater political
knowledge increased support for such programs among both blacks and whites. Thus, increasing and
equalizing levels of political knowledge would increase aggregate support for racial equality and for
programs designed to achieve such equality.
Also relevant to the concerns of this paper, we found that following politics in the media —
especially print media — increased levels of political knowledge. In addition, while blacks were
generally less informed about politics than whites, when the issue was of specific relevance to blacks
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and/or when they involved local issues in communities where blacks made up a significant portion of
both the general population and of government, racial differences in knowledge were diminished or
disappeared.
Interpersonal Communications: Providing Opportunities for
Intra-Group, Inter-Group, and Elite-Public Deliberations
While the mass media is crucial to the exchange of information within and across communities,
inter-personal communications are also vital to this process, and thus to the creation and maintenance of
communities. While research in this area is under developed and of mixed quality, there is evidence that
bringing people together in settings where they have the opportunity to meet with fellow citizens and
political elites, exchange their views on important issues, learn more about these issues, and so forth, is
beneficial in many ways: increasing political knowledge, political efficacy, political interest, political trust,
and a sense of political community; finding areas of consensus; and developing an understanding of
difference (Delli Carpini, 1996; Fishkin, 1995; Fishkin and Luskin, 1998; Putnam, 1995; Brehm and
Rahn, 1995). There is also evidence that such face-to-face exchanges can also change aggregate
opinions on substantive issues from those held prior to such deliberation (Fishkin and Luskin, 1998;
Delli Carpini, 1996; Yankelovich, 1991).
The extent to which Americans engage in activities that afford them the opportunity to interact
with fellow citizens is a matter of some dispute. Putnam (1995) sees a dangerous decline in community
engagement, and, as a result, low levels of trust among citizens. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995),
however, argue that the vast majority of Americans engage in some level of political, secular, and/or
religious activities, and about one third of Americans attend meetings or have worked with others to
address community problems (see also Verba and Nie, 1972: 31).
There is also mixed evidence regarding differences in community engagement between whites
and non-whites. According to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) there is little difference between
African Americans (19%), Latinos (14%), and Anglo Americans (17%) in the amount of informal
community activity they engage in, and once active, there is also little difference in the amount of time
these groups devote to community involvement. In addition, church membership (an important
institution for community interaction) is greater for African Americans (74%) than for Latinos (62%) and
Anglos (66%).
On the other hand, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) also find that African Americans and
Latinos are significantly less likely than white Americans to belong to either political or non-political
organizations. African American and Latinos citizens are also significantly less likely to be asked to
participate in non-religious community activities — a deceptively simple yet important predictor of such
participation. And African Americans and Latinos are significantly less likely to have contacted a public
official or member of the media to express their views on issues of the day.
The evidence is less mixed regarding class. Poorer Americans are significantly less likely to
engage in informal community activity, less likely to be members of a political or non-political
organization, less likely to a member of a church, less likely to be asked to participate in community
activities, and less likely to have contacted an elected official or member of the media.
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The internet provides a new venue for community and elite-public interaction. However,
African Americans, Latinos, and low income citizens are less likely to have access to this technology at
home, in schools, or at the workplace (Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, 1994; 1995).
Finally, while open to dispute, at least some research and theory suggests that the increased use
of television is contributing to a general decline in civic engagement (Fallows, 1996; Postman, 1985;
Hart, 1994; Putnam, 1995. But see Norris, 1996).
Communities or Colonies? Areas For Future Research
Several conclusions can be drawn from extant research on communications. First, while
ostensibly designed to create a diverse information environment that is open to a wide range of opinion,
the mass media in the United States was always more limited to resource-poor, culturally and racially
“marginal” groups. Second, this bias was exacerbated by the growing centralization of the media, and
by changing views of the proper role of the media. Greater centralization increased the already sizable
hurdles faced by lower income, racial/ethnic minorities for control or access. The economics of this
more centralized mass media put pressure on both mainstream and minority media to focus on more
upscale populations and concerns, as well as on more sensationalized, entertainment-oriented fare. The
assumption that political elites in general and the media professionals in particular were responsible for
determining the form and content of public information increased their gate keeping power, further
decreasing the possibility of intra-group and elite-public communications, while at the same time
distorting inter-group communications.
These structural biases, and their resulting effects on the portrayal of poor and/or racial
communities have clear implications for how different economic and racial/ethnic groups view both each
other and themselves. The media plays a critical role in setting the public agenda, framing issues,
priming how citizens think about these issues, shaping deep-seated attitudes and opinions, and providing
citizens with usable information about the political and social world. Interpersonal communications can
insulate communities from some of the more divisive aspects of mass media, allowing for more nuanced,
experiential, and deliberative exchanges. But these exchanges require opportunities and resources that
are often unavailable to inner city residents. And the likelihood and nature of these exchanges is still
strongly affected by the larger mass media environment in which they occur.
Given the lack of control over intra-group, inter-group, and elite-public communications, poor,
urban, racial/ethnic populations come closer to colonies than communities. As indicated by the sizable
differences in opinions across class and race, this hegemonic information environment has not prevented
poor, racial/ethnic citizens from maintaining a distinctive, rational world view. It has, however, worked
against the formation of informed, interconnected inner-city communities who are able to translate their
collective interests into political power. It has led to a greater likelihood that middle class, white
America will either ignore, misunderstand, and/or undervalue the views and opinions of non-middle
class, non-white America. It has worked against the possibility of finding areas of consensus across
diverse communities. And it has worked against the possibility of addressing differences in a way that
respects and encourages cultural diversity while remedying economic and social inequities.
At the same time, it would be a mistake to only emphasize the negative aspects of the current
18

information environment. The power of the media as an information provider, agenda-setter, and issue
framer, if properly harnessed, provides tremendous opportunities for revitalizing poor, inner city, ethnic
communities. When made aware of its biases, the mainstream media has demonstrated some sensitivity
to its portrayal of minorities and the poor, and very recent trends show at least some evidence of
improvement. Mediated events like the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings, the Rodney King
videotape and the O.J. Simpson trial drew public attention to issues of race and class that put these
issues on the national agenda and created real opportunities for discourse (Fiske, 1996). New
technologies the internet offer important new channels for inter, intra, and elite-citizen exchanges. Even
ostensibly negative portrayals of race like the “Willy Horton” campaign ad created subsequent debates
that worked to highlight the inherent racism still present in the United States and the way in which the
media can be used to exploit this racism. For all its hegemonic centralization, the media environment
remains essentially porous and open to multiple uses and interpretations.
This being said, there is a great deal that is poorly understood regarding the nature and impact
of communications on inner city, poor, racial/ethnic communities. In particular, further research is
needed in the following areas:
(1) Specific Research on the Impact of Communications in and on Inner City Poor
Ethnic/Racial Communities: While the research described in this paper is instructive, few studies
focus exclusively on inner city, poor, racial/ethnic communities. More work needs to be done on both
how portrayals of such communities affect the knowledge, opinions, and behaviors of non-residents,
and, especially, how residents of these communities are affected by their patterns of intra, inter, and
public-elite exchanges. This research should take advantage of prior research, and of the methodology
of surveys and statistical analyses, but should not be limited to such assumptions or techniques.
Detailed, qualitative, anthropological approaches such as depth interviews and participant observation
would provide useful and much needed theory development and fine-grained understandings of how
inner city, poor, ethnic/racial communities negotiate within an information environment over which they
have little control. Comparative studies across different classes and ethnicities within these communities,
as well as across different urban communities (with presumably different resources and networks of
communication) would also be invaluable.
(2) The Impact of Cultural Exchanges: In examining the political consequences of
communications, “news” is often privileged over other forms of information. And yet as discussed in this
paper, “entertainment” media — music, film, television dramas and comedies, sports, and so forth —
are clearly important for how communities are bound together and see each other. While research in
this area exists, it needs to be further developed, especially as it applies to urban, racial/ethnic groups,
whose culture is at the same time often expropriated by white society and vilified. This research should
also focus more on the social, political, and policy implications of what is often viewed as purely cultural
issues.
(3) The Impact of New Media Technologies: One of the factors that makes studying the
impact of the media difficult is the pace at which the media itself changes. New media — from
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expanding cable stations, to satellites transmissions, to high definition television, to interactive television,
to the internet — create new potential problems and opportunities. More research is needed on the
dangers and benefits of these newer forms of communication, focusing on their ownership, content,
impact, and accessability, especially as regards inner city ethnic communities. For example, while access
to the internet is growing among all groups, significant disparities based on race and especially class and
education exist. For example, in a recent survey by The Pew Research Center For The People and the
Press, fewer Blacks (17 percent) than Whites (24 percent) reported having gone “on-line” in the last
day. More dramatically, only 13 percent of those earning less than $20,000 did (as compared to 48
percent of those earning over $75,000 a year), as did only 16 percent of those with less than a high
school degree (compared to 44 percent of those with a college degree). These disparities can also be
seen across communities: as recently as 1994, half the population of Palo Alto, California had home
computers, modems, and access to the internet, while fewer than 10 percent of Chicago residents could
make this claim. Access to other communications technologies such as telephones, cable, and vcrs also
show differences by race, education, and income. And despite its very real potential for greater diversity
of programming and greater interactivity, new media like cable and to a lesser extent the internet ares
increasingly owned and/or effectively controlled by a shrinking number of corporations. These issues
are especially important in that policies regulating the development and spread of these technologies are
currently being developed.
(4) Research on Local Media: Most studies of the mass media tend to focus on the national
media. While obviously important, more needs to be known about the role of more local media in inter,
intra, and local elite-citizen exchanges. It is at this level that the greatest potential for meaningful reform
to occur in ownership, content, and thus impact. One particularly promising avenue in this regard is the
“public journalism” movement. This movement, spearheaded by the Center for Public Life and the
Press at NYU, the Poytner Institute, and by foundations like Kettering and the Pew Charitable Trusts,
aims on making local media a more integral part of the community and for it to play a more central role
in not only identifying local problems, but in providing information and opportunities that help in solving
those problems.
These four areas of inquiry are all aimed at providing better, more detailed information regarding
the impact of various forms of communication on poor, inner city ethnic communities. But to revitalize
communities requires a better understanding of the possibilities for and limits on change. Given the
complicated mix of types of communication available in inner cities, and the diversity of ethnic/class
backgrounds of inner city residents, predicting the impact of changes in the communications environment
is difficult at best. Carefully designed studies that include multi-method approaches to assessing existing
community resources and information networks are crucial:
(1) Mapping Community Resources: While research suggests poor, urban, racial/ethnic
communities lack resources for effective intra, inter, and elite-public communications, most of the
evidence for this is highly aggregated and somewhat circumstantial. Detailed studies at the local level
are needed which carefully “map” real and potential resources for inter-personal and mass mediated
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communications, as well as who owns/controls these resources. Such a project would involve an
inventory of existing voluntary associations, neighborhood publications, local cable and broadcast
television stations (including public access), local radio stations, computer/internet availability, book
stores, movie and live theaters, and so forth. It would also include availability of “public spaces” for
interpersonal exchanges such as community centers, libraries, coffee houses, parks, taverns, and so
forth. Understanding the existing infrastructure for communications is the first, key step for revitalizing
communities.
(2) Mapping Community Information Networks: In addition to better understanding
existing resources, it is important to understand existing patterns of how these resources are actually
used, and by whom. There is still remarkably poor information on the day-to-day inter-personal and
mediated information environment of inner city, poor, racial/ethnic residents. Who speaks to whom?
How often? About what? Where do these exchanges occur? What, specifically, is read, listened to, or
watched? How much of this daily personal and mediated exchange is intra-group oriented, inter-group
oriented and/or elite-public oriented? Knowing more about the information environment of inner city
poor ethnic/racial residents would serve to better identify the actual contours these communities (given
the assumption that it is through communications that communities develop). For example, in what
sense, based on the actual flows of information that exist in inner cities, can we talk about African
American, Asian, and various Latino residents as part of a single community? It would also help identify
how existing communications resources may be under-utilized, and what new resources need to be
introduced.

Information regarding extant resources and information networks would serve two main
purposes. First, they would provide crucial information for public officials, activists and the media on
how best to both find out community concerns and for disseminating important information. Second,
they would identify underutilized resources as well as “gaps” in communications chains that need to be
remedied. Both of these would be crucial in our own decisions as to how best to devote resources so
as to have a meaningful impact on community revitalization. For example, particular communities may
already have well-developed community information networks that are underutilized in terms of social
and political issues. Others may have networks that work well within certain, constrained subgroups
within the community, but require ways of connecting these networks across larger inter or intra
community groupings. Still others may need to find ways to connect to political elites or to the larger
political community. In addition to pointing to ways of efficiently improving the information environment
in specific communities, these mapping projects could identify already existing networks that could serve
as models for other communities. Many communities are already experimenting with various ways of
increasing civic discourse through partnerships among government, media, civic associations, and
business interests (Rosen, 1998, forthcoming; Delli Carpini, forthcoming). These experiments could
serve as useful lessons.
Armed with the information drawn from the approaches discussed above, I would recommend
that we consider investing in our own community-based “experiments.” Once we have mapped existing
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community resources and information networks, and have identified successful experiments from other
communities, we could apply these approaches (or other approaches more carefully tailored to
particular community needs). It is my hope that these experiments would allow us to find the best ways
to invigorate the information environments within communities.
For example, what would be the short and long term impact of creating forums that allowed
inner city residents to regularly discuss issues of relevance with each other, absent changes in the larger
media environment? How should such forums be structured? How homogeneous or heterogeneous
should the participants be? What would happen if an existing community-based newspaper, radio
station, or television station changed its reporting style from a mainstream to a “public” or “civic”
journalism approach (Rosen, 1998), devoting more of its coverage to uncovering the interests of inner
city residents, giving these residents greater voice in — even control of — the media, and working
towards encouraging community forums and problem-solving rather than problem identification? What
effect would such a public journalism approach have in mediums whose readership or audiences cut
across diverse communities? What impact would providing inner city residents with computers,
modems, and internet access, along with guidance and instruction on using this technology, have on the
quality and quantity of intra, inter, and elite-public exchanges? While efforts in all of these areas are
occurring, they are happening unsystematically, without real input from inner city residents themselves,
and without much attention to ways of evaluating their impact.
(3) Shaping The National Media Environment: While my emphasis has been on local
community, ultimately we need to consider how these local communities interact with the larger, national
media environment, and how changes in that environment might help in both improving communications
within local communities and in bringing these communities into the national political debate. This
agenda, while more ambitious, would require three-pronged strategy. First, there needs to be greater
efforts to work with the national media (news and entertainment) to help shape media content in ways
that would be more sensitive to needs and interests of urban, poor, and ethnic communities.
Environmental groups have been effective at lobbying writers, producers, and so forth in shaping media
content and might serve as a useful model (Gay rights groups have also had some success in this
regard).
Second, there needs to be a greater effort to lobby the federal government as it develops
policies regarding media ownership, content, and access. The general direction of these policies in
recent years has been towards a disturbing combination of free-market competition coupled with special
advantages for the already well-established media conglomerates. The result has been the kind of
industry centralization described above, as well as a decreasing ability of less-powerful communities to
influence patterns of hiring and content. While some efforts to consider the impact of federal media
policy exist (Bowie, 1990), more can be done in this area. Coalitions of citizen groups have been
effective at putting issues of violence and sexually-explicit content on the national agenda — these
efforts could serve as models.
If community and communications evokes notions of commonness, race, ethnicity and class
evoke notions of difference. The current communications environment clearly works against creating a
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sense of community based on commonness, celebrating the differences that add to the vibrancy of a
polity, and identifying and remedying differences that are based on economic and social inequities. In
the end, this requires giving inner city, poor, racial/ethnic residents the means through which they can
communicate effectively and equitably with each other, with citizens of different economic and ethnic
backgrounds with whom they are bound into larger communities, and with political elites who are
responsible for translating community interests into public policy.
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